Within the context of games on networks S. Goyal (Goyal (2007) , pg. 39) posed the following problem. Under any arbitrary but fixed topology, does there exist at least one pure Nash equilibrium that exhibits a positive relation between the cardinality of a player's set of neighbors and its utility payoff? In this paper we present a class of topologies in which pure Nash equilibria with the above property do not exist.
Introduction-Motivation
Games on social networks is a rapidly developing discipline the importance of which has been extensively discussed in recent publications Goyal (2007) , Jackson (2008) and Vega-Redondo (2007) . One of the goals of this discipline is the development of a framework within which the effect of the structure of relationships on individual behavior and well-being as well as on aggregate outcomes can be examined systematically.
The social sharing of information (Bramoulle and Kranton (2007) ) which is privately costly to collect is one of the economic contexts within which the effect of network structure on individual behavior and aggregate outcomes are currently being studied. Within this context Goyal posed a question that addresses the effect of ones's neighbors on his/her payoff at equilibrium. In this paper we provide an answer to Goyal's problem.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we present the social network model and Goyal's problem. In section 3 we present preliminary results that are essential in determining a solution to Goyal's problem. In section 4 we present an example that provides a negative answer to Goyal's problem. We conclude in section 5.
We consider a set N := {1, 2, 3 · · · , N} of players. These players are connected, directly or indirectly, with one another through a network whose topology is denoted by g; g is fixed. Since g is fixed the set N i (g), i ∈ N , of neighbors of player i is well-defined; two players i, j are called neighbors if they are directly connected with a link in the graph that corresponds to the topology g. Each player can choose a strategy/effort s i ∈ S, where S is compact and convex in R + . Let s ∈ S N , s := (s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s N ) denote a strategy profile. Given s ∈ S, the payoff of player i, i ∈ N , is given
where c is the marginal cost of effort and it is a fixed positive constant. The function f is such that f (0) = 0, f (·) > 0, f (·) < 0, and there is a constant δ such that f (δ) = c. The function f and the constants c and δ are common knowledge among the players. Consider a game played by the N players, with strategy space and utility functions described above. Assume for the moment that there exist Nash equilibria in pure strategies, called pure Nash equilibria (PNE ), for this game. Denote by PNE g the set of PNE of the game when the network topology is g. Denote by PNE + g the subset of PNE g that have the following property:
where |N i (g)| denotes the cardinality of the set N i (g). PNE + g is called the set of PNE g that exhibit for every player i ∈ N a positive relation between the cardinality of N i (g) and the player's utility/payoff under g.
Let G denote the set of the all possible topologies of the N players' network. Goyal (2007) , pg. 39, posed the following problem:
Goyal's Problem: Under any arbitrary but fixed topology g ∈ G is the set PNE
One would expect a positive answer to the above question. In the model under consideration the players' payoff functions are identical. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that players with a higher number of neighbors would earn a higher payoff at equilibrium. In this paper we provide a negative (thus, in our opinion counterintuitive) answer to Goyal's problem. We present, via an example, a class of topologies for which PNE + g is empty.
Preliminaries
First we assert that for every topology g ∈ G the corresponding game possesses PNE. This assertion follows from the compactness of the space S, continuity of f (·) in the players' strategies, the concavity of f (·) in each player's strategy, and a result of Debreu, Glicksberg and Fan (Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) pg. 34). For any g ∈ G all PNE g can be characterized by the following result.
Theorem 1 (Goyal (2007) , pg. 35) For a given g ∈ G, a strategy profile
The following lemma reveals a property of PNE + g . This property along with the result of Theorem 1 are critical in establishing our answer to Goyal's problem.
Proof: We prove the result by contradiction. Consider s
Furthermore, since ε > 0, f is increasing, and j∈Nu(g) s * j ≥ δ, it follows that
which contradicts the fact that s * ∈ PNE + g . Consequently, we must have
2 Remark 3 Using the arguments in the proof of Lemma 2 we can also establish the following results:
• Independently of an agent's degree, if s * ∈ PNE g and s *
Equivalently, if at equilibrium agent i is no better off than agent j then agent i contributes no more than agent j.
• Let s * ∈ PNE g be such that
Using the results on the existence of PNE, Theorem 1 and Lemma 2, we present an example that provides a negative answer to Goyal's problem.
An Example
Consider the network depicted in Figure 4, We consider six cases that exhaust all possibilities.
• Case 1:
= 0 along with Lemma 2 imply that
therefore,
Since by assumption s * ∈ PNE + g , s * ∈ PNE g . Therefore, s * must satisfy the condition of Theorem 1. This further implies that
But (9) contradicts (7), thus we can not have any s * ∈ PNE + g with s * v 2 = 0.
• Case 2: 0 < s * = 0 implies that
On the other hand, by Theorem 1 we must have
g , by Theorem 1 we must have
Furthermore, by assumption
Then Eqs. (13), (14) and Theorem 1 imply that s * v 3
), or, equivalently,
because ∆ > 0. On other other hand, Theorem 1 applied to node v 2 gives
Equations (15) and (16) contradict one another.
• Case 4:
In this case, Theorem 1 applied to node v 3 gives
Inequality (17) combined with the assumption ∆ + s * v 2 ≥ δ result in
Equation (18) and Lemma 2 in turn imply that
which contradicts (19).
• Case 5:
The result of Theorem 1 for node v 3 along with the above conditions imply
Then, by Eq. (21) and Lemma 2 we must have
which contradicts the assumption
• Case 6: s * v 2 ≥ δ. Then, the result of Theorem 1 for node v 2 and s * v 2 ≥ δ imply
Equation (24) and lemma 2 result in
which along with Lemma 2 imply that
On the other hand, the result of Theorem 1 for node v 5 requires that
which contradicts (26).
The analysis of cases 1-6 demonstrates that no matter what value s * v 2 takes, s * / ∈ PNE + g . Consequently, the set PNE + g is empty.
Conclusion/Discussion
Note that the example presented here is not necessarily minimal, but it introduces a class of topologies (games) with finite tree structure such that
• (i) the degree of nodes (except the terminal/leaf nodes) increases monotonically as their distance from the root of the tree increases.
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Furthermore, consider any topology/game that results in from arbitrary extensions along the leaf nodes of the tree structure of Section 4. By the same arguments as in Section 4 we can show that PNE + g is empty for those topologies/games.
The form of the utility function, namely the fact that the function f has all the properties stated in the model and is the same for all players, is critical in establishing a negative answer to Goyal's problem. The class of network topologies g for which PNE + g is nonempty remains unknown.
